Faculty of Business Administration

Visiting Scholar Seminar

Impression Management, Strategy-related Disclosure and Excess Executive Compensation: Evidence from China

Dr. Li XIE

Lecturer in Accounting and Finance, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate whether overpaid executives have an incentive to justify their excess compensation by engaging in impression management practices in strategy-related disclosure, especially in China with the socialist environment and collectivism culture and weak corporate governance. Using a sample of 10,673 firm-year observations based on non-financial Chinese listed firms during the period from 2007 to 2016, we find excess executive compensation triggers firms’ impression management in strategy-related disclosure. This positive causal relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs. We also find this positive relation is less significant in firms when board independence is higher, the shareholding of the second largest shareholder is higher, and institutional shareholdings are higher, showing that these internal and external governance mechanisms could limit the self-serving disclosure behavior of managers.

Date: 16 Dec 2019 (Mon)

Time: 16:00 – 17:00

Venue: E22-2011

Short Biography

Dr. Li XIE is a Lecturer in Accounting and Finance of International Business School Suzhou at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University in China. His research interests lie in the field of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (Patent; SMEs; R&D subsidies) Corporate Governance (e.g., voluntary disclosure, impression management, board of directors, & earnings management) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). He has published articles in journals such as Small Business Economics and Contemporary Economics Policy.